COUNTRY HANDBOOK

CENTRALIA

20140814

KEY FACTS

Background: The Centralian Islands consist of 4 major islands and more than 40 small islands or reefs. They are surrounded by rich fishing grounds and potentially by gas and oil deposits. Centralia is a former state of the country of Montanya but was subjected to British rule as a colony in the mid-1700s because of its proximity to Montanya, a supplier of silk and spices.

Upon release of that colony from British rule after WWI Centralia opted for independence, relying on their fishing and lumber exports to support their economy via trade with numerous other countries. Centralians felt that Montanya had sold them to the British who abused the population and exploited their natural resources for their shipbuilding and ports. Upon obtaining their independence, Centralia set up trade agreements with several other countries in the area, excluding Montanya. Centralia has become westernized and has been an ally of the U.S. since its occupation in WWII by the Japanese and liberation by U.S. forces. Centralia has continued to subsist since then on its rich fisheries, and lumber exports as a developing nation. Recent discoveries of Indium Oxide (a key and rare component in touch screen technology) has sparked interest in the area and the value of Centralia to the world has markedly increased. Several countries are vying for renewed and new trade agreements with the Centralia including Montanya, which, because of its history with the Centralia, is still excluded from nearly all trade.

Official country names:
Conventional long form. Constitutional Republic of Centralia
Conventional short form. Centralia
Local long form. Republic of Centralia
Local short form. Centralia



National Flag. The Centralian flag consists of three equal, horizontal bands; Blue (top), Red (middle), and Blue (bottom). It also has Scroll and Tuna fish centered, and two banners inscribed with the latin words for Independence and Liberty. The Centralian flag's colors date from the mid 15th century and represent the water surrounding the islands which has provided them sustenance and wealth throughout their history. The Blue Fin Tuna represents the mainstay of the rich fisheries around the island while the scroll represents their current constitution, written in 1947 after their liberation from the Japanese.

Chief of state. The tribal king, Josephi Kingbak, is merely a figurehead and holds no executive or legislative power. This position has been preserved since the days before British colonialism.

Head of government. President Armand Peewee was elected in May 2011 and is supported by the majority of the populace.

Capital. Camp Barrett

Time. –4.0 hours UTC (formerly GMT)

Language. English (75 percent), Chinese(10 percent) Tagalog (5 percent), Japanese (5 percent), Other (3 percent)

GEOGRAPHY AND CLIMATE

Climate

The climate of Centralia is humid subtropical with long, hot summers and mild winters. The mean daily minimum temperature in the coldest month, January is 34 F and the mean daily maximum in the hottest month, July is 94. July, the wettest month, is also the peak month for thunderstorms with an average of 11 days with thunderstorms out of the month.



Topography

Centralia is a small chain of non-active volcanic islands characterized by rolling terrain, dissected by small streams with steep side slopes. Surface slopes generally range from 0 to 15 percent and elevation ranges from a low of 200 feet to a high of 459 feet. Vegetation in Centralia consists largely of pine and oak varieties of trees. Forests, consisting of evergreen needle leaf and deciduous broadleaf trees, compose about 80 percent of the country's area. Evergreen needle leaf trees include loblolly pine, Virginia pine, and shortleaf pine. Deciduous broadleaf trees include primarily yellow poplar, white oak, northern red oak, sycamore, black gun, sweet gun, beech, hickory, and black walnut.

Pines are on higher slopes and well drained area. Deciduous trees consisting of upland and lowland hardwoods parallel streams in most areas.

Grasslands compose approximately six percent of the country's area, specifically in landing zones and drop zones. Grasses are classified as short, seldom reaching heights of one meter. Major species include fescue, bluegrass, bluestem, Johnson grass, broomsedge, crabgrass, Bermuda, and orchard grass.

Beaches around most of the islands are rocky with sharp volcanic gravel interspersed by volcanic and limestone boulders. Surrounding the island chain are numerous rocky shoals and reefs characterized by jagged surfaces and water from 3-10 feet deep at low tide and 6-13 feet deep at high tide.

Terrain and Weather Effects on Military Operations

Centralia's terrain favors the defender and is generally ill-suited to armored or mechanized operations. Mobility is hindered by rocky beaches and shallow reefs surrounding the islands severely restricting access by landing craft which break the waterline. The moderately dense

forested uplands restrict both tracked and wheeled vehicles to unimproved and improved roads. Foot movement is moderately slowed by combined effects of trees, brushy vegetation, and sporadic steep slopes. The vegetation that afford the best cover and concealment for foot troops are the dense evergreen needle leaf year-round and dense deciduous broadleaf forests from mid-May through September.

Due to the vegetation, there is good cover from flat-trajectory fire of small arms for foot troops in the dense stands and fair cover in the more widely spaced stands. The vegetation also offers fair to good concealment from aerial and ground observation year around. Visibility will be restricted from May to September. During this period expect that the evergreens and deciduous trees will restrict visibility to 50 meters in the low lying areas and 100 meters in the higher terrain. From late September till May expect visibility to increase to 100 meters in the lowlands and 150 to 200 meters from higher terrain.

The reefs, shoals, and rocky beaches make most amphibious landings untenable on the islands of Centralia. There are ports located on several of the islands but only the port of Onville can handle a ship longer than 100 feet and with a draft more than 13 feet.

CULTURE

Statistics

Population	254,300 (July 2001)
Growth Rate	0.72%
Age Structure	0-14 years: 34% (male 43,200/female 43,262) 15-24 years: 19.1% (male 19,428/female 29,143) 25-54 years: 36.8% (male 42,112/female 56,149) 55-64 years: 5.7% (male 6,522/female 8,690) 65 years and over: 4.4% (male 5,035/female 6,153) (2013 est.)
Birth Rate	17.1 births/1,000
Death Rate	5.41 deaths/1,000
Infant Mortality	29.04 deaths/1,000 live births
Life Expectancy	72.21 yrs (female 75.31 yrs; male 69.26 yrs)
Religion	Catholic 82.9%, Muslim 5%, Evangelical 2.8%, Buddhist 4.5%, other Christian 2.3%, other 1.8%, unspecified 0.6%, none 0.1% (2000 census)
Labor Force	165,000 (1998); agriculture 63%, manufacturing 18%, services 19%; Shortage of skilled labor

Ethnic Groups	Maconian 51%, Britito 24%, Damag and Amiraulti 8%, Samisrita 7%, Buddhist 3%, other 7%

Centralia's population has doubled since its liberation in 1947, resulting in increased demand and competition for jobs and educational opportunities. During the post WWII period, the Centralian government encouraged early marriage and discouraged family planning for religious and political reasons with disregard to long-term societal ramifications.

This caused a population explosion that led the government to reverse its policies and promote a vigorous population control program. Currently, the Centralian birthrate is less than 2 percent. However, more than 36 percent of Centralia's population is younger than 15 years-old, and the population is estimated to grow to at least 300,000 before 2020.

Society

Population Distribution

Centralia is a multiethnic and multilingual society. The Majority of Centralia's population is Maconian and speaks English; another fourth speaks other Indo-Chinese languages or dialects. The Centralian descends from Asian tribes, which may have migrated to the Centralian Islands from the Southeast Asian region around 3000 BC. Numerous periods of occupation and immigration by political dissidents from the surrounding nations have shaped the Centralian population. Because of this diversity and longstanding history of immigration, the cultures have learned to cohabitate effectively and there is very little animosity or conflict along cultural lines.

Ethnic Divisions

Religious toleration, a characteristic of Centralia as a colony and monarchy, diminished drastically during the Japanese occupation. After the country’s liberation in 1947, this tolerance returned.

Social Organization

The most influential societal element in Centralia is the family. It is the focus of an individual's primary loyalty and the basis for his identity, prestige, and ambitions. Extended families and the formation of family alliances through marriage also are important.

Centralia's class distinctions transformed after colonization. Colonization shifted power from the tribal king and elders to wealthy land owners, industrialists, and financiers. After the end of colonization the social structures remained and Centralians merely filled in the gaps left by the British colonists.

Because of the nature of fishing and the lumber trade, most centralians still reside outside of the major cities, generally in small villages along the coast. The central highlands and the northern islands remain sparsely populated by those employed in the lumber trade.

Structures and Infrastructure

There are few cities in Centralia where water is scarce. Most towns are supplied with water by the numerous freshwater streams running throughout the hills towards the coast.

Structures in urban Centralia are generally of brick, block, or reinforced concrete and aging. Outside of the cities, building materials are wood, bamboo and thatch.

In major cities, purified water is piped into the houses; small towns and villages rely on wells, springs, or rivers. Central heating is uncommon except in modern buildings in major cities. Portable kerosene heaters, iron stoves using wood and coal, and charcoal are common heat sources.

Health facilities in cities and rural areas are inadequate. There is a shortage of doctors, nurses, and medical supplies, especially in rural areas. Public hospitals provide free but inadequate treatment for the poor.

Cultural Considerations

Centralia has a core culture shared by its ethnic groups. Common cultural traits result from centuries of sharing beliefs, values, history, language, religion, social customs, and are a fundamental to Centralian culture.

Family. Centralian families are "nuclear" and close; family loyalty has stronger meaning than in the West. Individuals are expected to place the family's needs before personal needs. The man is the head of the household, and children, even adult children, must obey fully. It is expected that children will care for their parents as adults.

Fishing. Centralians consider themselves a seafaring people. It is impolite and offensive to question a Centralians ability to live off the sea or navigate.

Japanese. Because of their treatment during the Japanese occupation, many older Centralians still have animosity for occupation by a foreign force, and the Japanese in general.

Personal status. Social class and family background determine personal status more than individual character and achievement.

Marriage. Centralian marriages are often arranged, a leftover tradition from the colonial period which has remained throughout the years.

THREAT

Political Instability

Discontent with many government policies, and outspoken Centralian minority who believes they should return to a monarchy as a state under Montanya, has led to incidents of public disorder. High inflation, unemployment and a lack of public infrastructure have all been factors contributing to social unrest. Dissatisfaction has increasingly provoked public demonstrations in major cities that have sometimes turned into riots. Moreover, as public debates polarize, violence occurs between supporters of opposing political viewpoints. With renewed interest in Centralia, Montanya has been covertly fomenting unrest specifically in the northern islands in an attempt to gain access to valuable natural resources.

Foreign Relations

Centralia's foreign policy mirrors that of its colonizers in the 1700s. Trading is accomplished with its closest neighbors but Centralia has largely stayed out of international politics.

Montanya. Centralia is a former state of the country of Montanya but was subjected to British rule as a colony in the mid-1700s because of its proximity to Montanya, a supplier of silk and spices. Upon release of that colony from British rule after WWI Centralia opted for independence, relying on their fishing and lumber exports to support their economy via trade with numerous other countries. Centralians felt that the Montanya had sold them to the British who abused the population and exploited their natural resources for their shipbuilding and ports. Upon obtaining their independence Centralia set up trade agreements with several other countries in the area, excluding Montanya. Centralia has become westernized and has been an ally of the U.S. since its occupation in WWII by the Japanese and liberation by U.S. forces. Centralia has continued to subsist since then on its rich fisheries, and lumber exports as a developing nation. Recent discoveries of Indium Oxide (a key and rare component in touch screen technology) has sparked interest in the area and the value of Centralia to the world has markedly increased. Several countries are vying for renewed and new trade agreements with the Centralia including Montanya, which, because of its history with the Centralia, is still excluded from nearly all trade. Additionally, Montanya has publicly announced their approval for the CRF insurgency in Centralia. Currently, it is believed, that the Montanya Regular Army has begun to supply the CRF with small arms, ammunition, logistic support and training. There are indications that Montanya will deploy military units into Centralia prompting U.S. involvement.

Political Extremism. Since 2006 there have been numerous incidents of violence in Centralian cities and villages that have been attributed to, or claimed by, groups opposed to the Camp Barrett government.

Insurgency. Various unofficial opposition groups exist. The most significant of these are the Centralian Revolutionary Forces (CRF); the Centralians for Constitutional Monarchy (CCM); the Communist Party of Centralia (CPC); and the international eco-terrorist organization Blue Fin Protection League (BFPL).

ARMED FORCES

Order of Battle

Composition

Centralia Revolutionary Force/ Montanyan Regular Army

The CRF goal is to disrupt stability, discredit the relief organizations, and legitimacy of the government of Centralia in order to insert themselves as the legitimate state government under a unified Montanya. This includes organizing, equipping, and training ground forces to achieve its goal of instability.

Organization

Although an insurgency, the CRF have deployed into a structured table of organization. The CRF typically operate at the fire team and lower level; however they have the capability, training, and command and control to function at the squad. A typical squad will have nine members, with one unit leader and 2 teams of four. A CRF platoon is typical comprised of 3 squads.

Intelligence indicates that the MRA have deployed two companies into the northern islands of Centralia since United States have established a Forward Operating Base at Camp Barrett on the main island. The MRA companies will have 3 Fire teams of 4 Montanyans each and a Squad Leader for each Squad. The platoons will typically have 3 squads, but they do have the capability to reinforce the platoon with a machine gun squad.

Equipment

Towed Artillery			**Mortars**		
Type	Role	Quantity	Type	Role	Quantity
105-mm M-101A1	Howitzer	36	60-mm M-19	Light Mortar	9
155-mm M-114A1	Howitzer	18	81-mm Hadid	Medium Mortar	8
Artillery Total		54	120-mm Hadid	Heavy Mortar	Unk
			Mortars Total		Unk

Infantry Weapons			
Type	Role	Type	Role
.45 cal M1911A1	Pistol	9-mm Beretta 92	Pistol
5.56-mm M16A4	Rifle	5.56-mm M249 SAW	Light Machinegun
7.62-mm AK-47	Rifle	7.62-mm Dragunov	Rifle
7.62-mm RPK	Light Machinegun	7.62-mm M240B	Medium Machinegun
12.7-mm DShK	Heavy Machinegun	40-mm M-79	Grenade Launcher

Strength

The enemy is estimated to have 325-400 members operating through Centralia.

Military Doctrine

The CRF does not have a clear military doctrine. The fundamental principles governing the force employment are best described as Western-oriented. The relationship the United States had with Centralia after WWII still influences the CRF operations. More than 1,000 military advisors were in Centralia during the post war period and throughout the recent years. Many Centralian military personnel that trained in the U.S. have since joined the CRF. Centralia likely judged DESERT STORM as a validation of Western doctrine superiority over Soviet (or Russian) doctrine. Although there are some semblances of Western doctrine, the CRF have modeled a hybrid asymmetrical doctrine. The CRF have an understanding in both asymmetrical and conventional, however they have the ability to integrate into a conventional warfare when working with the MRA. In the asymmetrical fashion, they rely on ambush and delaying operations. When the CRF operates in a conventional fashion, they will resemble the MRA's doctrine.

The MRA does have an established doctrine:

Ground Doctrine. MRA infantry doctrine is based on American and British doctrine. However, battlefield experiences from the numerous internal rebellions, the Bamboo War and the infusion of newer, Soviet weapon systems have produced uniquely MRA doctrine and tactics. Exploited publications emphasize a doctrine of combined arms, but in reality, the MRA practice coordinated arms where all battlefield operating systems are present but not necessarily synchronized and focused on destroying enemy centers of gravity. There is little evidence to suggest that MRA conducts true combined arms operations as defined by the principles of U.S. maneuver warfare.

MRA doctrinal deficiencies stem, in part, from insufficient command and control above the company level. This limitation prevents the experimentation and training that would provide a foundation for doctrinal change. MRA's remain infantry-intensive; most of its fire support is delivered by light and medium mortars.

MRA's doctrinal weakness lies in its reliance on the senior leaders on the battlefield. The MRA does not encourage initiative and creativity.

The main tenets of the enemy's doctrine follow:

- The MRA must fight and win against a technologically superior enemy. The lessons from both the Bamboo War and Operation DESERT STORM have not been lost on the leadership. In both conflicts, the MRA observed that the technologically superior force has the advantage. Until they can compete in the technical aspects of modern ground combat, it will confront technologically superior foes with an asymmetrical response.
- Always create conditions for surprise and use it to confuse the enemy and break his will to resist. The MRA is adept at using darkness and inclement weather to mask movements. The MRA knows much about U.S. dependence on satellite reconnaissance and will use periods of cloudy weather to its advantage. Large-scale infiltration, night attacks, attacks during inclement weather, deceptive troop movements, and attacks from unlikely avenues of approach are all tactics that have worked well for the enemy in past combat operations.

Tactical Offensive Maneuver Concepts. The task of every MRA maneuver unit in the offense is to approach the enemy and kill or capture him. There are two basic roles for units in the offense: maneuver and support. Maneuver units close with the enemy for the final assault. Support units cover the advancing maneuver units with organized direct and indirect fires.

In the offensive, MRA has relied heavily on massive infantry assaults supported by mortars. Preparatory fires and ground reconnaissance across the front have preceded such assaults.

The ground forces remain closely tied to terrain-based objectives.

***Conduct of the Offense*.** MRA tactical doctrine is generally terrain-oriented. Attention is paid to selecting control measures and objectives that are easily identified by maneuvering units. MRA doctrine also places importance on using darkness as a combat multiplier. Assault timelines are crafted to enable units to reach their objectives, consolidate, and reorganize for the defense before daylight. During these night or low-visibility attacks, doctrine calls for the use of a "base unit" by which other units orient themselves toward the objective. The use of patrols and guides is also frequently mentioned. Radio silence is strictly enforced to maintain surprise.

There are essentially four phases to MRA ground attacks. They are the following:

- **Planning**. Commanders conduct reconnaissance of enemy locations, establish control measures, plan maneuver routes and formations, and coordinate for supporting fires. Primary and secondary positions for units providing supporting fires are established with precision. Targets for these fires are assigned for each phase of the operation through the

consolidation phase. Based on the results of reconnaissance and other intelligence available, a unit leader will task-organize the units involved to ensure that the correct type and amount of combat power is available during the attack. Infantry platoons are also structured to include a support of machineguns and/or rocket launchers.

- **Maneuver from the assembly area to the Line of Departure**. The goal during this phase is to advance rapidly from the assembly area to the Line of Departure. Movement should be continuous, using all cover and concealment available, to include smoke and supporting fires. A commander should not become decisively engaged with insignificant units during his movement to the attack line. He should direct supporting fires toward the area of resistance and press towards the objective.
- **Maneuver from the Line of Departure to the target**. The commander moves his forces into the final attack formation and ensures that supporting fires are shifted off the target to prevent friendly-fire casualties. Due to the fragmentation patterns of grenades and artillery rounds, the unit will go on-line 100 to 150 meters from the target. To reduce risk of injury from friendly fires, unit commanders can use organic grenade launchers to shell enemy forward positions in lieu of supporting mortars.
- **Consolidation on the target**. When the attacking unit reaches the target, it must assume a defensive position and prepares to repulse any attempted counter-attack. Unit commanders must impose strict fire control to prevent aimless use of ammunition. It should gradually reorganize and prepare for the next task while watching for signs of a counterattack. The unit commander should quickly dispatch small protection elements forward to maintain contact with the retreating enemy.

Tactics for the pursuit of a retreating enemy are absent from MRA offensive doctrine. MRA instead emphasize the smooth transition to the defense and holding of terrain. Lack of mechanized assets and limited responsive logistical capability deny MRA the use of speed and operational tempo as weapons.

Tactical Defensive Concepts. MRA conduct defensive operations to prevent enemy forces from taking critical pieces of terrain, to protect the flanks, to gain time, to economize resources, or to destroy attacking enemy units. The mission of the defensive ground unit is to stop the enemy with fire before he reaches the combat position or to force him to withdraw by close combat should he reach the combat position. Defensive doctrine recognizes one basic defense; the position (static).

Every defensive operation has the following two elements:

- **Protection (Security) Force**. This element acts as a picket, providing advance warning of an enemy attack. It also engages the attacking force, attempting to halt or delay its advance and to deceive the enemy regarding the actual location of friendly battle positions. It is generally deployed in Fire Team- or buddy pair elements by the platoon.
- **Forward Defense Force**. The majority of the defending unit's combat power lies in this element. The forward defense forces are responsible for disrupting enemy formations and destroying them by organic and supporting arms.

Planning the Defense. The primary MRA principles for planning and executing defensive operations follow. MRA doctrine emphasizes the uniqueness of each tactical situation and the responsibility of the leader to apply each consideration as required.

- **Good use of terrain**. MRA doctrine adopted the same terrain considerations used by U.S. forces: obstacles, avenues of approach, key terrain, observation and fields of fire, and cover and concealment. MRA will use the advantages afforded by Centralia's generally inhospitable terrain, augmented by combat engineering efforts to retard the advance of any attacker.
- **Protection**. This element of defensive planning is analogous to the U.S. term security. The defending unit protects itself by taking measures to avoid surprise, such as patrols, surveillance, obstacles, and warning equipment. Another component of protection is denying the enemy information about the defensive plan through camouflage and sound, light, and radio discipline.
- **Mutual Support**. Units support each other with fire and/or movement. The commander assigns sectors of fire to ensure mutual support.
- **All-Around Defense**. The unit should be ready to quell attacks from any direction.
- **Defense-in-Depth**. This is essential to the MRA defense. If the enemy is prepared to sacrifice troops, assets, and time, then the forward defense force will be penetrated. A defense-in-depth denies the enemy freedom of movement in the main battle and rear areas.
- **Flexibility**. This consideration involves planning alternate and supplementary positions for the defending unit.
- **Dispersion**. MRA doctrine espouses dispersing units widely to the platoon level, to defend against IDF attack.

Building and Coordinating Defensive Measures. There are two plans for preparation and coordination:

- **Fire Support Plan**. The MRA fire support plan stresses the use of long-range fires as early in the attack as possible. Close defensive fires should be designed to increase in volume as the enemy enters the main battle area. Final protective fires are also planned for close-in fire support. This plan includes both organic (direct and indirect) and supporting arms. The plan must ensure that all obstacles are covered by fire.

- **Obstacle Plan**. The natural defensive characteristics of the ground are reinforced by the effective use of obstacles. Obstacles achieve two goals: (1) they stop or slow the enemy and allow him to be brought under fire; (2) they force him to move into unfavorable territory. Once again, obstacles should be under observation and fire. The obstacle plan must be coordinated with higher headquarters.

Defensive Considerations.

- **Unit Defensive Frontage**. An infantry platoon can occupy a front of 400 meters. In open terrain, the distance between each two-soldier fighting position must not exceed 20 meters. There should be no more than 200 meters between forward platoons of an

infantry company. These distances are affected directly by visibility conditions, fields of fire, terrain, unit strength and attachments, and the enemy situation.

- **Depth**. An infantry platoon's defensive location depth is measured from the primary to the alternate and supplementary positions. It should be no more than 200 meters. Alternate and supplementary positions require good fields of fire and covered and concealed routes to and from primary positions.

- **Execution of the Defense.** When the protection force observes the advancing enemy, indirect fire is initiated to slow or halt the attack. The section leader in charge of the protection force coordinates with the platoon commander for the withdrawal of the protection force across the main battle area into the company's battle position.

  As the enemy advances, he is brought under increasing direct and indirect fire. Defensive positions undetected by advancing enemy units should hold their fire until the enemy is within range of small arms to gain the advantage of surprise and conserve ammunition.

If the enemy assault reaches the forward defense force, final protective fires, called rescue fires in MRA terminology, are used. These rescue fires involve automatic weapons, mortars, and artillery. All of these weapons fire until the attack stops or ammunition is exhausted. When the attack stops, the cease-fire order is given by a pre-arranged signal (usually a colored flare). If the enemy assault penetrates the rescue fires, the defending unit is to engage it with all means for close combat inside the position.

If a successful penetration is made into the defensive position, the commander will order his subordinate elements to direct their fire toward the breach and/or move to alternate positions to contain the attack.

After the attack, local security must be established immediately. Patrols are dispatched along enemy withdrawal routes. Wounded are evacuated and equipment and ammunition are replaced.

Amphibious and Landing Operations

The MRA has a large naval force primarily employed to protect its territorial waters and coastline. The MRA does not have fixed wing aircraft carriers but do maintain ships capable of transporting, launching and recovering helicopters of the CH-46 and CH-53 varieties. These assets can put approximately a platoon ashore before returning to refuel and refit. The MRA has an antique amphibious capability consisting of approximately a section of Amphibious Assault Vehicles, of the P7 and C7 varieties. The serviceability and doctrine used for the AAVs is unknown.

Terrorism and Subversion

The CRF sponsored or inspired terrorism has claimed the lives of more than 1,000 people in the country of Centralia since 1968. The CRF has employed various tactics over the years, to include

kidnappings, acts of sabotage and subversion, ambushes and attacks on government personnel and projects and assassinations of opponents in the Centralian government.

The CRF's involvement in terrorism was most intense in the last 18 months because of the recent discovery of Indium Oxide on several islands within Centralia. This mineral is a rare, valuable and key component in touch screen technology.

Command and Control

Currently the CRF C2 is poor, however if given enough time to mass their combat power their C2 will improve and is likely that they will begin operating in Plt sized elements. They have limited command and control capability, devoting most of these assets to support their indirect fires.

Disposition

The enemy has deployed through out Centralia.

Currently there are CRF independent fire team and squad size elements, operating south of MCB-6; specifically near DZ Raven, LZ Hawk, LZ-7 and the Capitol of Camp Barrett.

The MRA have threatened to deploy two companies in the northern islands.

Training

Training generally occurs in well organized training camp in Montanya. Known training camps include: Bakersfield (infantry and armor), Hangtown (signals), and Kingman (field artillery). Those members of the CRF, especially the majority of the leadership, had training from the United States in the 1970s. Although the current training is unique, it is a hybrid of both United States doctrine and asymmetrical warfare.

Logistics

The enemy does not an official or responsive logistical system. At the larger echelons, they do not have a logical network that can handle a push system. Logistically, they can not maintain long-term campaign. At the tactical level, however, the enemy's logical capability is extremely effective, utilizing the spoils of war, the populace, and Montanya for resupply.

Assessment of the Enemy

Strengths

- Maneuverability at the Fireteam and Squad level is provided by the intimate knowledge of terrain and foot mobility.
- CRF/MRA possesses trained ground force with knowledge of Western doctrine.

- The CRF/MRA has many battle-tested commanders and SNCOs in its ranks.

Weaknesses

- The enemy has sacrificed sustainability for short-term combat capability.
- The enemy has little experience functioning larger than a company.
- The enemy will likely suffer from a logistical strain.
- The enemy has no identifiable doctrine, which may hamper its effectiveness [NOTE: This lack of identifiable doctrine complicates adversaries' assessment methods and makes devising effective countermeasures more difficult].

Capabilities and Limitations

The enemy has limited capability to conduct modern combined arms operations. There are several reasons for their limitations: a force structure predominated by infantry units; old and poorly maintained equipment; poor command, control, communications and intelligence capabilities; and a logistics infrastructure incapable of supporting large offensive operations.

Defend

On the main island of Quantico, the enemy lacks the capability to conduct a long term defense due to their size; however that size affords them the capability to initially defend utilizing natural cover and concealment. If they do conduct an initial defense, it is likely they will counterattack, no matter the size of the remaining force.

North of Quantico, the enemy have the ability to establish a deliberate defense. This is due to the enemy's capability to operate at the platoon level, coordinate with adjacent platoons, and sufficient time and supplies to establish a deliberate defense. The enemy does have the capability to defend in the urban environment due to the ability to quickly fortify a harden structure and the predictable avenues of approach that the streets and structures provide.

Reinforce

Reinforcement in the south is unlikely given their dispersion between forces and their lack of mutual support. Additionally, the enemy will be unable to reinforce with anything larger than a platoon in less than 12 hours.

In the north, the enemy units positioned throughout the AO typically operate at the squad level but are capable of reinforcing to a platoon (-) strength within (45) minutes. They are thought to be able to mass to platoon (-) strength only with great effort. Reinforce with up to a platoon is expedited due to the proximity of viable MSR's.

Attack

On the main island of Quantico, the enemy has shown the ability to conduct small scale attacks when they can achieve surprise. The enemy has shown the ability and willingness to attack

unexpectedly despite their relatively small size. As we move north, the enemy will have the capability to conduct deliberate attacks at the squad level, and with some effort, the platoon level.

Withdrawal

Throughout the AO, the enemy capability to Withdrawal is easy to accomplish and likely. Withdrawal historically has been followed by a counterattack of varying sizes. North of Quantico, due to their control of the MSR network, the enemy retains the ability to withdraw from established positions to conduct link-up with other elements of the enemy forces within the area of operations. Within the urban environment, the enemy are not expect to withdraw, as the urban centers are crucial to their continued operations within Centralia, and they will hold them at all costs.

Delay

Throughout Centralia, the enemy will attempt to delay our movement north. In the north, it is expected that the enemy may utilize adjacent units to attempt to delay a company-size movement. They will accomplish this by using a defense in depth and attempting to attrite our forces.

Enemy's Most Likely Course of Action

The CRF and MRA will attempt to discredit the Centralia Government by conducting small scale attacks on the urban areas and ambushes on relief organizations throughout Centralia. The CRF will delay the U.S. movement to the north utilizing independent squads and platoons sized elements. This will be accomplished in a defense in depth and attrition, with fire team and squad size CRF units in the south and MRA squad size to company size units in the north. Upon initial contact, the small units in the south will withdrawal to the north to reinforce larger units in the north, thus massing for a decisive engagement. The enemy positions will be tied into key terrain, with observation on likely avenues of approach. The enemy will generally be oriented to the south to counter our direction of movement. As we continue to move north towards the Island of Upshur, the MRA will have prepared defensive positions. The MRA will prepare their defense along MSRs to facilitate movement of supplies and reinforcements. They will utilize an obstacle plan to canalize an advancing enemy, long range fires to break up formation and cause the enemy to commit early, and have security established in the form of an active patrolling effort and LP/Ops. The CRF/MRA will withdrawal to the north into Montayan territories to reorganize and re-equip once they are repelled by the U.S. / Centralian Army. Once the enemy has regained its combat effectiveness, they will conduct a counterattack regardless of the echelon they are attacking.

Center of Gravity

The enemy's center of gravity is their ability to delay using a hybrid United States and asymmetrical doctrine focusing on attrition warfare by withdrawing on contact to mass with larger units to the north, natural terrain to canalize, and combined arms from light/ medium mortars and artillery.

Critical Vulnerability

The Critical Vulnerability of the enemy is there command and control. At all echelons, there is a lack of subordinate decision making. Delegation and initiative are not encouraged. Mission type orders are obsolete and all decisions are made by unit leaders. Communication between adjacent units is limited due to dispersion and all communication assets are dedicated to the use of indirect fires. Due to the problems associated with Command and Control, the enemy's ability to delay is executable although hindered.

APPENDIX A:
Equipment Recognition

SMALL ARMS

7.62-mm AK-47/AKM 	
Maximum Effective Range	400 m
Caliber	7.62 x 39-mm
System of Operation	Gas, selective-fire
Overall Length	34.25 in.
Magazine Capacity	30-rd, staggered row detachable box magazine
Weight (Loaded)	8.7 lbs
NOTE: While the AK is a heavy weapon it climbs rapidly during automatic fire	

7.62-mm G37.62-mm Dragunov SVD 	
Maximum Effective Range	1300 m
Caliber	7.62 x 54-mm
System of Operation	Gas, semiautomatic
Overall Length	48.2 in.
Magazine Capacity	10-rd, staggered row detachable box magazine
Weight (Loaded)	9.5 lbs

7.62-mm RPK 	
Maximum Effective Range	800 m
Caliber	7.62 x 39-mm
System of Operation	Gas, selective fire
Overall Length	48.2 in.
Magazine Capacity	40-rd, staggered row detachable box magazine or 75-rd drum magazine. Can also use 30-rd AK magazine
Weight (Loaded)	1.13 kg (40-rd box) 2.1 kg (75-rd drum)

7.62-mm PK 		
	Maximum Effective Range	800 m
	Caliber	7.62 x 54-mm
	System of Operation	Gas, automatic
	Overall Length	47.2 in.
	Magazine Capacity	100, 200, or 250-rd metallic link belt
	Weight	19.8 lbs

12.7-mm DShK Model 38/46 		
	Maximum Effective Range	1,000 m
	Caliber	12.7 x 108-mm
	System of Operation	Gas, automatic
	Overall Length	62.5 in
	Magazine Capacity	50-rd metallic link belt
	Weight w/Mount	259 lbs

GRENADES, MORTARS, AND MINES

40-mm M-79 Grenade Launcher 	
Caliber:	40 mm
Operation:	break-open, single shot
Weight:	loaded, 2.95 kg; empty, 2.72 kg
Length:	737 mm
Barrel:	356 mm
Sights:	fore, blade; rear, folding leaf, adjustable
Chamber pressure:	210 kg/cm2
Muzzle velocity:	76 m/s
Max range:	ca 400 m
Max effective range:	area targets, 350 m; point targets, 150 m
Min safe firing range:	training, 80 m; combat, 31 m

RPG-7 	Maximum Effective Range	330 m (moving targets) 500 m (stationary targets)
	Caliber	40-mm (launcher diameter) 85-mm (grenade)
	Overall Length	1.1 m

TOWED ARTILLERY

105-mm Howitzer M1/M101

Range	11,270 m
Weight	2034 kg
Ammunition types	HE, HEAT, Illum, Smoke (WP)
Crew	5-7

M114A1 155-mm Howitzer

Caliber:	155-mm	**Elevation/depression:**	+63/-2º
Muzzle brake:	no	**Traverse:**	
Carriage:	split trail	**(right)**	25º
Shield:	optional	**(left)**	24º
Weight:		**Rate of fire:**	2 rounds
(travelling order)	5,800 kg	**(first 30 s)**	8 rounds
(firing position)	5,760 kg	**(first 4 min)**	16 rounds
Length (travelling):	7.315 m	**(first 10 min)**	40 rounds
Width (travelling):	2.438 m	**(per hour, sustained)**	14,600 m
Height (travelling):	1.803 m	**Max range:**	18,100
Ground clearance:	0.229 m	**Crew :**	5 ton (6 x 6) truck

MORTARS

Hadid 120-mm Mortar 		
	Caliber:	120 mm
	Length of Barrel:	1.726 m
	Weight:	in firing position, 138.5 kg
	Weight (barrel and breech piece):	42.5 kg
	Weight of Sight Unit:	1.5 kg
	Diameter of Baseplate:	880 mm
	Elevation:	+45 to +85º
	Range:	min, 250 m; max, 6,200 m
	Rate of fire:	max, 10 rds/min

Hadid 81-mm Mortar 		
	Caliber:	81.4 mm
	Length of Barrel:	with breech, 1.558 m
	Weight:	in firing position, 50.5 kg
	Weight (barrel and breech piece):	18 kg
	Weight of Baseplate:	17.5 kg
	Weight of Sight Unit:	1.5 kg
	Diameter of Baseplate:	555.5 mm
	Elevation:	+43 to +85º
	Range:	min, 150 m; max, 4,900 m
	Rate of fire:	20 rds/min